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Feed-in tariffs for promoting solar PV: progressing from dynamic to allocative 
efficiency 
William Paul Bell, University of Queensland 
John Foster, University of Queensland 
Abstract 
The International Energy Association has observed that nearly all countries now offer or are planning 
feed-in tariffs (FiTs) for solar PV but debate has shifted from ‘if or how to implement a FiT’ to ‘how to 
move to a self-sustaining market post FiT’.  The aim of this paper is to explain how a sustainable FiT 
can be designed for residential solar PV installations, focusing on the case of ‘solar rich’ Australia.  
Solar PV is approaching price parity at the retail level where the electricity price charged includes 
both transmission and distribution costs, in addition to the wholesale price.  So the economic 
rationale for paying a FiT premium above market rates to achieve dynamic efficiency is no longer 
warranted.  Socially, FiTs can be a problem because they tend to exacerbate social inequality by 
providing a transfer of wealth from poorer to richer households.  Environmentally, FiTs can also fall 
short of their full potential to cut emissions if they lack ‘time of day’ price signals that reflect 
movements in the wholesale price. 
In this paper, we provide a framework in which a sustainable FiT can be designed that positively 
addresses all three areas of concern: social, environmental and economic.  This framework identifies 
the market failures that exist in the residential solar PV electricity market, which include 
exacerbating inequity, poorly targeting myopic investment behaviour, inadequate transmission and 
distribution investment deferment price signals and inappropriate infant industry assistance.  We 
argue that these market failures require addressing before the market can operate in an allocatively 
efficient manner. 
The sustainable FiT that we propose would lead to improvements in environmental, social and 
economic factors.  The resultant transmission and distribution investment deferment would meet 
both environmental and economic objectives.  Directly providing finance for solar PV installations 
would address both social equity and investment myopia.  We argue that introducing appropriate 
pricing signals for solar PV installations via would be in the ongoing interest of all stakeholders.  It is 
time to progress from FiTs focused on dynamics efficiency to a sustainable FiT that emphasises 
allocative efficiency as an explicit goal. 
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1 Introduction 
The International Energy Association (IEA 2011, p. 33) observes that nearly all countries now offer or 
are planning FiTs for solar PV but debate has shifted from ‘if or how to implement a FiT’ to ‘how to 
move to a self-sustaining market, post FiT’.  Additionally, the IEA (2011, p. 33 ) acknowledges 
internationally FiTs have been poorly designed or poorly controlled, resulting in explosive markets, 
profiteering, political interference, over-reliance on imports, market collapses, business closures and 
so on.  However there is now a wealth of information available worldwide to policymakers regarding 
the impact of various designs of FiT schemes and how and when to adjust tariffs to avoid overheated 
markets.  For example, Couture and Gagnon(2010), Timilsina, Kurdgelashvili and Narbel (2012) 
Solangi et al. (2011), Gipe (2011) and Zahedi (2009, 2010) provide an extensive and current 
discussion of FiTs. 
Previous and current FiTs have been found to be a source of four market failures: 
• exacerbating inequity (Garnaut 2008; Nelson, Simshauser & Kelley 2011); 
• poorly targeting myopic investment behaviour (APVA 2011a, 2011b); 
• inappropriate infant industry assistance (Farrell 2011); and 
• lacking transmission and distribution investment deferment price signals (Futura 
2011; PwC 2011).  
Under the guise of an infant industry argument, many countries have implemented FiTs to establish 
a domestic PV industry.  This policy has been overly successful causing a cross subsidy via electricity 
prices that has resulted in: inequity to favour the rich over the poor; challenges to policy credibility; c 
poorly targeted  industry assistance; failure to connect with transmission investment strategies.  In 
addition, in countries with state based FiT policies, such as Australia, Canada and the US, there has 
been inconsistent gross or net FiTs calculation between states (DSIRE 2012; REN21 2011; Wong 2008; 
Zahedi 2010). 
Our focus here is on residential solar PV install because three features together differentiate them 
from other forms of renewable energy: 
• they are embedded within the distribution network; 
• there are many small suppliers without market power dealing with a few retailers; 
and  
• suppliers are too small to offer bids in the electricity market. 
We identify problems with the existing FiTs using a sustainability framework and then propose 
solutions.  First, we discuss the investment myopia and social inequality problems that exist in 
existing FiT schemes and we explain why indexed interest free loans can directly address these 
issues.  Next, we discuss price signal issues with existing FiT schemes and how an alternative set of 
price signalling system can be designed to achieve a sustainable FiT. This includes real time and 
locational pricing to guide investment deferment in distribution and transmission and to improve 
energy conservation. 
The implications of adopting a sustainable FiT are: 
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• steadier economic growth in the solar PV industry rather than the boom bust 
cycles that have ensued from numerous government regulatory changes required 
to keep up with the rapidly changing technology and decreases in prices; 
• a more equitable arrangement by removing the cross subsidy from non-owners to 
owners of solar PV units; and 
• more environmental protection potential to defer investment in distribution and 
transmission and to reduce CO2 emissions. 
2 A sustainability framework 
A sustainable FiT (see Figure 1) must positively address three factors: social progress, environmental 
protection and economic growth (IUCN 2006). 
Figure 1 Sustainability framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: IUCN 2006) 
From an environmental perspective, roof top solar PV installations appear ideal, as they produce 
electricity with low life cycle emissions and help to defer investment in distribution and transmission.  
However, seen within a broader context, there are social and economic issues that require 
addressing.  The US corn to ethanol biomass industry provides a useful illustration of social and 
economic problems that can arise when seemingly ideal environmental policies are implemented.  
The recent episode of the US government subsiding corn for ethanol production increased the price 
of corn, which is a staple diet for many poor people in Central America.  This ethical dilemma of 
using food crops or arable land to produce biomass is an undesirable outcome.   Fortunately, rooftop 
solar PV installations do not pose such serious ethical problems.  However, Garnaut (2011, p. 15) 
discusses how those consumers receiving FiTs are being cross-subsidised by other consumers, 
generally on lower incomes.  In agreement, Nelson, Simshauser and Kelly (2011) have estimated the 
household impact of FiTs by income groupings and conclude that wealthier households are clear 
beneficiaries and the effective taxation rate for low income households is three times higher than 
that paid by the wealthiest households.  Therefore both the current FiT and the US government’s 
corn to ethanol subsidies are socially regressive.  
In addition to ethical considerations, Stebbins (2011) reports that there has been a farm price bubble 
in the Corn Belt created by the US government subsidies, which is proving politically difficult to 
manage, as rural communities become accustomed to higher wages and profits.  So this well 
intentioned US government policy has unintentionally created ethical conundrums grounded in a 
Economic Social 
Environmental 
Equitable 
Sustainable 
Bearable Viable 
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maladaptive political economic dynamic. This provides a warning to those trying to implement infant 
industry legislation without a clear exit strategy that prevents such legislation becoming a 
permanent fixture.  A strong case can be made that there are many parts of the emergent 
renewable energy sector requiring R&D and initial assistance for commercialisation.  But rooftop 
solar PV installations are no longer in the  infant industry stage because residential rooftop solar PV 
is near market parity (Watt 2011), that is the cost of electricity from solar PV equals the costs of 
electricity from coal generators plus transmission and distribution costs.  However Watt (2011) does 
concede that parity may be insufficient to induce investment in solar PV as people expect a much 
quicker payback on capital than  net present value calculations would indicate.  This myopic 
investment behaviour and other non-market barriers have to be addressed in any new policy 
initiative. 
3 Investment myopia and social inequity  
The Australian PV Association (APVA 2011b) and Watt (2011) discuss how solar PV has reached grid 
parity.  Electricity can now be generated on residential rooftops at the same price as coal generation 
plus transmission and distribution costs. However, parity seems to be insufficient to ensure the 
appropriate economic level of residential solar PV uptake because people suffer investment myopia 
over the returns from long term investments, such as the 25-30 year life of a PV unit.  This is not 
uncommon in the case of long term investments because of the uncertainty involved. For example, 
in the case of PV panels, people are uncertain as to whether the cost of PV units is going to continue 
to fall significantly and, therefore, it may be rational just to defer the investment decision until later, 
even though the investment looks attractive from a net present value perspective.  
Yates and Mendis (2009) and Williams (2011) discuss the sensitivity of demand for solar PV 
installation to interest rates and to financing and clearly observe the presence of investment myopia.  
A similar kind of long term investment market failure that has been well researched is in the 
superannuation industry. This has spurred government intervention in the form of a complex array 
of policies including tax breaks for both voluntary contributions and compulsory contributions.  
Similarly, the Australian government has intervened to remedy a market failure in the provision of 
tertiary education by offering indexed interest free student loans, repayable through the income 
taxation system, to provide equity and to acknowledge the positive externalities of education. 
Origin Energy (2007) argued for interest free loans to promote efficient energy investments to 
address positive externality and equity concerns.  Sunders, Gross and Wade (2012) discuss the 
socially regressive aspects of the Renewable Heat Incentive in the UK and how low interest loans for 
low income households could address the issue.  A similar argument can be made for interest free 
loans for investments in solar PV.  In trying to address  equity and investment myopia issues, the use 
of tax breaks tends to favour  richer households over  poorer, while making interest free loans, with 
repayments based on the ability to pay similar to the Australian student loan scheme (HECS), is a 
much more equitable way to address investment myopia.  Additionally, a loan is more appropriate 
form of assistance, as there is an incentive for the prospective buyer to consider the solar PV 
installation as an investment requiring a cost benefit analysis rather than a means to obtain a tax 
break.  Additionally, loans for these long term investments are appropriate candidates for the 
revenue generated from carbon pollution reduction schemes (CPRS).  Furthermore, identifying 
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which transmission and distribution lines are nearing their maximum capacity would yield locational 
priorities for lending to target transmission and distribution investment deferment. 
4 Maintaining policy credibility and perpetuating social inequality 
As discussed in the previous section, Garnaut (2011, p. 15) and Nelson, Simshauser and Kelly (2011) 
observe how richer households receiving FiTs are being cross-subsidised by poorer households.  So, 
there is a policy dilemma, which is, maintaining policy commitments and credibility can perpetuate 
economic inefficiency and social inequity.  One resolution to this policy dilemma, without disrupting 
the market, would be to maintain FiTs fixed permanently in nominal terms to those consumers 
contracted, so the influence of the agreed FiTs would gradually fade out with time and these 
replaced by a more sustainable FiT regime (Garnaut 2008). 
5 Infant industry and solar PV’s parity with retail tariffs 
A key issue in the assessment of the economic viability of solar PV energy supply is the trajectory of 
future cost per kWh.  All new technologies follow S-shaped diffusion curves that can usually be 
tracked by a nonlinear logistic or a Gompertz function.  As the volume of adoption rises, unit costs 
fall, usually log linearly (exponential) to a minimum level.  There are four reasons for this: economies 
of scale in production, the accumulation of experience in production and marketing, the 
introduction of incremental innovations and growth in demand for products using the technology.  
There is a well developed literature on forecasting future diffusion paths based on observations in 
the early phase of the diffusion curve.  Similarly, forecasts of future unit costs have been conducted 
using early phase cost data (see Alberth (2008) for a recent study of several cases, including solar, 
Nemet (2006) deals specifically with PV). 
Universally, unit costs fall significantly but this introduces something of a dilemma for a potential 
buyer. When is the best time to buy? When production volume is small and unit price is high, only 
‘enthusiasts’ tend to buy, either for ethical reasons or to impress others as an affluent ‘first mover’ 
that can afford the high price. So, if the development of a technology is widely viewed as a social or 
environmental priority, it is vital that, in the early developmental phase, significant ‘infant industry’ 
subsidies are offered both to encourage purchase of products using the technology and to make 
producers feel secure enough to invest in expanding production. There is no ‘futures market’ in 
technologies, so both buyers and sellers have to be compensated for taking their respective risks in 
what is an uncertain context. 
Stephen O’Rourke has estimated unit cost curves for different PV technologies. His chart is 
reproduced in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Solar PV industry outlook 
 
(Source:  O'Rourke 2007) 
O’Rourke compares high-efficiency crystalline silicon (c-Si), currently most preferred; thin-film 
copper-indium-gallium-selenium (CIGS), which is just entering the market; thin-film amorphous 
silicon (α-Si); and thin-film cadium-telluride (CdTe) on glass. He concludes that all of these 
technologies will become competitive with conventionally generated electricity prices in the 2013-
2016 period.  As is sensible in such studies, ranges rather than point estimates are reported but it is 
clear that solar becomes viable by about 2013 onwards.  
Incremental innovations will increase the efficiencies of distributed PV collectors very significantly 
and unit costs will come to strongly out-perform coal-based power station generated electricity in 
terms of consumer price. We know that the unit price of coal generated electricity has shown little 
historical decline in recent years, consistent with it being a mature technology. And, evidently, the 
introduction of a carbon price or a tax would shift the unit cost of coal-based power upwards, 
bringing the price crossover forward. 
In Germany, the tendency for unit costs to fall has been acknowledged and FiTs have been adjusted 
downwards as the price of solar PV units has declined.  However, the issue arises as to when parity is 
reached, and what kind of ‘market based’ FiT, if any, should be implemented.  The timing of arrival 
at parity will differ between countries and between residential and large scale solar PV.  For instance 
O’Rourke (2007) estimates the US will reach parity sometime between 2013 and 2016 whereas Watt 
(2011) calculates that Australia has already reach parity.  Five factors explain why Australia is likely 
to arrive at parity earlier than most other countries:  
• the high level of solar radiation in Australia makes the equivalent solar PV panel 
more productive than in most other countries; 
• by international standards, electricity prices in Australia are particularly sensitive to 
the upward movement in fossil fuel prices, as Australia has a high reliance on fossil 
fuel generation; 
• Australia lacks solar cell production, so can look internationally to secure the 
cheapest panels without concern about destroying domestic production; 
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• the commodity boom has pushed up Australia’s exchange rate, making the 
importation  of solar panels cheaper; and  
• the imposition of a fixed carbon price of $23/tCO2 as of July 2012 is predicted to have 
a 8.9% increase in residential electricity prices (Wild, Bell & Foster 2012). 
6 Developing price signals to further reduce emissions and to 
maintain solar PV market growth 
Designing a market or developing appropriate price signals to reduce emissions and to maintain 
solar PV industry growth requires consideration of institutional arrangements that impede the 
effectiveness of the market mechanism.  This section focuses on price signals but highlights 
institutional impediments as they arise.  
Lessar and Su (2008) propose market based FiTs using a two-part tariff consisting of a capacity 
payment that is determined through an auction process, and an energy payment that is tied to the 
spot market price of electricity.  Large scale solar has yet to reach parity; by contrast residential solar 
PV in Australia has arrived at parity.  This differing level of industry development warrants 
alternative treatment for large scale and residential solar PV.  Section 6.8 discusses developments in 
the Australian Capital Territory using a reverse auction for capacity for large scale solar PV.  The 
reminder of this section is devoted to developing appropriate price signals for residential solar PV.  
In contrast to Lessar and Su (2008), this section stresses the importance of price signals for the cost 
of transmission use of service (TUOS) and distribution use of service (DUOS) as well as the spot 
market price of electricity.  Additionally, this section’s focus on residential solar PV differs to other 
broader studies on FiTs for large scale renewable generation in Timilsina, Kurdgelashvili and Narbel 
(2012) and Solangi et al. (2011). 
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC 2012) is currently reviewing Demand Side 
Participation (DSP) within the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM).  As part of the DSP 
review,  Futura (2011, pp. 27-8)  considered DSP as helping to manage demand via three routes: 
• peak load management; 
• whole of load management; and  
• distributed resources, including solar PV. 
Contributing to the DSP review, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC 2011) considered that a price signal 
should:  
• allow a business to recover at least the costs of providing a good or service, thus 
facilitating long term sustainable service provision; and 
• provide a signal to consumers to consume only where the value of consumption is 
more than the social cost of production 
Using such a price signal, a householder with solar PV installation is both a business and a consumer.  
Such price signals alone would fail to address social equity and investment myopia, as discussed in 
the previous sections.  The market needs careful design to ensure the right price signals are 
produced for all participants in the market to receive a fair allocation of the wealth generated by 
solar PV panels and to maximise the reduction in emissions. 
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There is an asymmetry in market power between the many residential owners of small solar PV units 
and a few retailers or single retailer in some states.  Left to the free market without intervention, 
retailers using their market power to maximise their profits could reduce the return on investment 
on solar PV to the householder to the point where the residential solar PV market ceases to grow 
and fails to reduce emissions further.  Additionally, networks service providers (NSP) base their 
profits on their capital investment, so to connect solar PV installation with the ability to defer 
investment in transmission and distribution is in direct conflict with the profit motive of NSPs.  These 
environmental and market failures warrant government intervention to determine a fair share of the 
generated wealth and to ensure appropriate price signals exist.  The following sections discuss 
distorted price signals and their remedy. 
6.1 Gross versus Net Feed in Tariff 
There is debate over whether a FiT should be paid for the net or the gross contribution to the 
distribution grid.  Farrell (2011, p. 33) discusses the major drawback of net metering, which is to 
encourage optimization of the size of a solar array for on-site load rather than maximising the solar 
array.  The economic argument favours gross; this way the investor can make the decision to install 
solar PV based on the contribution to the grid.  Under the gross payment method, the householder 
pays the retail rate for the total electricity consumed whether sourced from the grid or from their 
own generator. This provides an incentive for the customer to conserve electricity and maintains a 
profit motive for the retailer.  
A further problem with using a net FiT on accumulation meters is pricing the production of electricity 
from the solar PV unit and the consumption of a unit of electricity equally regardless of time of 
production or consumption.  Section 6.4 discusses a resolution to this problem. 
The question arises ‘what is a fair payment for the contribution to the grid from residential solar PV?’  
Table 1 shows breakdown of the cost components of the retail price of electricity to households as 
an average of the national retail prices. 
Table 1 Breakdown of the national retail price of a unit of electricity for 2009-10 
Component cents/kWh Percentage 
FiT, RET and energy saving schemes  0.94 5.0%  
Retail margin 2.93 15.1% 
Distribution (DUOS) 6.68 34.5% 
Transmission (TUOS) 1.42 7.3% 
Energy (Wholesale) 7.41 38.2% 
Total 19.38 100.0% 
(Source: PwC 2011, p. 14) 
Paying solar PV owners at least the wholesale price of the electricity is obvious.  In addition, the solar 
PV unit delivers electricity directly into the distribution grid without the requirement for 
transmission, so payment for the deferred cost of transmission is warranted.  Furthermore, the 
household will consume some or all of the electricity produced by the solar PV unit, so payment for 
the deferred cost of distribution is warranted for this self produced and consumed electricity. 
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The above FiT preserves the retailer’s profit margin and creates the right price signals for maximizing 
the size of solar PV installations and for deferment of TUOS and DUOS.  This method requires 
itemising charges for TUOS and DUOS on invoices. However, the wholesale price for electricity and 
the cost of TUOS and DUOS vary over time and between locations.  These factors would require 
addressing. 
6.2 Real time pricing, smart meters and FiTs 
There is a requirement for smart meters to enable real time pricing to provide efficient price signals 
for electricity produced by solar PV and for electricity consumed by the household.   However there 
is a lack of incentive for retailers and NSP to install smart meters (PwC 2011, p. 47) since smart 
meters can help customer reduce their consumption of electricity, which reduces the retailer’s profit.  
Additionally, smart meters can help ameliorate peak-loads which drive the expansion of the network 
linked to the profits of the NSPs. 
Solar PV electricity production matches the daily electricity demand of cycle of commerce and 
industry.  This cyclic match between commercial electricity demand and solar PV supply requires real 
time pricing and smart meter installations to provide the solar PV with appropriate recompense.  
This cyclic match contrasts with baseload electricity from fossil fuel generators that are required to 
maintain minimum stable operating levels 24 hours a day.  The minimum stable operating level has 
two negative aspects.  First it puts an effective floor on the minimum level of carbon emission 
reductions that can be secured.  Second this minimum level produces overnight negative spot prices 
(Pierce 2011), which drives out other forms of generation and in particular makes wind generation, 
which is often most productive at night, less economically viable. 
Currently in Australia transmission and distribution investments are made to ensure that peak 
demand is met.  Smith and Hargroves (2007) state that in Victoria the transmission system has to be 
20 percent bigger to meet peak demand for 1 percent of the year.  Over the past decades or so, 
growth in peak electricity demand in most of the states has grown at a faster rate than the increase 
in average annual demand.  This is particularly an issue in South Australia.  Spikes in peak demand 
only occur a few times during the year on extremely hot summer days when air conditioners are 
being run in households in addition to other appliances at the same time that the commercial and 
industrial sectors are consuming maximum power.  Since climate change is expected to produce 
more heatwaves, rising peak electricity demand could compromise system reliability without 
massive new transmission infrastructure investments. 
Futura (2011, p. 53) discusses how in summer, distribution network load peaks occur around 4 pm to 
7 pm.  However, solar PV output is about 30% of nominal rated capacity at 4 pm, which provides a 
modest contribution to moderating this residential peak in demand.  In winter, PV output is 
negligible during residential network load peaks.   Introducing real time price signals would provide 
an incentive to solar PV owners to consider energy storage systems to save energy for use during the 
more expensive peak time, which would help to defer investments in distribution and transmission.   
Section 6.6 further discusses storage.  
The AEMC (2009, p. v) considers fixed priced tariffs for retail customers a risk to the NEM, so it 
recommends more flexible pricing for retail customers to reflect  movements in wholesale prices 
coupled with  a national customer protection scheme to be introduced prior to the commencement  
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of flexible pricing.  A flexible retail consumer price reduces the risk for the electricity companies but 
transfers risk to the retail customer.  This transfer of risk necessitates protection for vulnerable 
consumers and education of consumers aided with in-house displays or internet portals on electric 
usage.  The World Energy Council (WEC 2010) has evaluated the residential smart meter policies of 
Victoria and claims that the lack of a promised in-house-display and of protective measures for the 
most financially vulnerable has  caused dissatisfaction amongst customers, which led to a 
moratorium on real time pricing.  Section 6.5 further discusses the Victorian experience leading to 
the moratorium.  
6.3 Pricing electricity from solar PV and the Merit Order Effect 
In Australia, the price for electricity is set every half hour using a merit order dispatch (MOD) system 
where the bids to sell electricity into the market are ranked in order of price in 5 minute blocks.  The 
electricity settlement price is set every half hour as the average of the six prices in the 5 minutes 
blocks that equates electricity supplied and demanded.  Using the MOD system means that the 
electricity from renewable sources such as wind and solar is used first because their marginal cost is 
close to zero, having no fuel costs.  Importantly, the system provides a half hourly market price for 
electricity produced by residential solar PV without the requirement for active participation by 
households in the market bidding process.  Additionally, the Melbourne Energy Institute (MEI 2012) 
has discussed a Merit Order Effect (MOE) operating in Germany where the MOD system and 
substantial solar PV installation have reduced the wholesale electricity prices.  Melbourne Energy 
Institute (2012) has modelled a MOE for the NEM assuming various solar PV penetration rates 
comparable to the German rates and has shown that a significant reduction in price spikes could 
have been achieved  over a the simulated summer period of 2010.  This MOE enhanced price 
stability is another positive externality that justifies policies to support solar PV installations.  
Significantly, the German solar PV implementation has proven system stability at much higher 
penetrations of solar PV than those in Australia.  Furthermore, Futura (2011, p. 11) stated that 
appropriately located solar PV in the grid can dampen the system wide peak demand for electricity.  
The next section investigates developing appropriate price signals for such deployment. 
6.4 Time of use and locational price signal for TUOS and DUOS  
Figure 2 shows the 16 nodes in a transmission line topology of Australian Capital Territory and New 
South Wales.  These nodes serve three functions: 
• Demand - the node represents an area or region of demand. 
• Supply - the node represents the connection point for non-distributed generators. 
• Transmission - two nodes represent the connection points. 
Figure 2 represents the topology of the network rather than geographic distance.  Geographically 
the demand is an area, the generators are points and the transmission lines are lines.  However, 
settlement prices are based on a regional basis rather than the finer granularity node based pricing, 
although node based pricing does occur.  The AEMC (2011) proposes nodal pricing as one of five 
options in the transmission framework review. 
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Figure 3 Stylised New South Wales transmission line topology of 16 nodes 
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Blowering  
Tumut 1: Units 1-4 
Tumut 2: Units 1-4 
Tumut 3: Units 1-3  
               Units 4-6 
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A branch of economics called ‘marginalism’ is frequently used to provide a theoretic basis for pricing.  
Applying marginalism to pricing the transmission and distribution of electricity is challenging.  
Nevertheless a discussion of marginalism informs the development of a pricing structure for TUOS 
and DUOS when making judgements over feasible pricing schedules given the metering available.  
Under marginalism a firm maximises profit by supplying at marginal cost.  Applying this theory 
presents two problems: 
• NSP are regulated monopolies; and 
• practical difficulties measuring and implementing the marginal cost. 
The NSP are regulated monopolies and as such must provide pricing schemes within the national 
electricity rules of Australia, which can accommodate long run marginal costing but there are 
constraints on application, such as the annual rate of change at each location.  But the national 
electricity rules could be modified to further accommodate marginalism.  
Addressing the marginal cost of NSP requires consideration of short run marginal costs and long run 
marginal costs (LRMC).  In the short run, one variable is held fixed.  The fixed variable is capacity.  In 
the long run all variables can change, including building more capacity to relieve congestion.  There 
is a challenge to develop a pricing structure for congestion to allow short run marginal costing.  The 
AEMC’s (2011) transmission framework review recognises a need to address complex problems of 
this sort and have identified the need for a framework based on the interrelationship among the 
following five factors: 
• the nature of network access 
• network charging 
• congestion 
• transmission planning 
• connections 
PwC (2011, p. 4) discusses the merits of charging the LRMC.  The LRMC is the cost to increase 
capacity to carry an extra unit of electricity at peak demand.  In contrast the LRMC during off peak 
time is effectively zero as load is easily carried within the existing infrastructure that is a sunk cost.  
This LRMC method for pricing TUOS and DUOS has implications for pricing solar PV output as 
discussed in section 6.1 where payments for deferred TUOS and DUOS would be modest.  This LRMC 
method would spur customers with solar PV to install storage and customers generally to reduce 
load during peak times. 
However, applying the LRMC has two drawbacks.  There would be insufficient revenue generated to 
recover operating costs and extremely lumpy pricing would prove unacceptable to customers.  Then 
a question arises “What pricing schemes can address the two drawbacks of LRMC but retain the 
price signal provided by the LRMC?” 
PwC  (2011, p. 23) discusses the importance of pricing TOUS and DUOS independently of wholesale 
sale electricity cost as pass through may not provide a good signal for network costing, given that 
peak wholesale prices do not always correlate with high demand periods.  PwC (2011, p. 28) reviews 
the current TUOS and DUOS pricing schemes in the NEM and finds differences amongst the 
jurisdictions based on: the pass through of costs from NSP to retailer; and metering type. 
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The network costs are directly passed through to the customers in the New South Wales, Australian 
Capital Territory and South Australia but in Queensland and Tasmania the network costs go via the 
retailer.  Direct pass through provides an unattenuated price signal whereas going via the retailer 
dulls the price signal.  Direct pass through of network costs suits the arrangements for solar PV 
payments as discussed in section 6.1. 
The current pricing structures for TUOS and DUOS are subject to three forms of metering: 
• accumulation; 
• interval; and 
• smart meters. 
Accumulation meters restrict the options for TUOS and DUOS pricing structures to: flat tariffs; and 
inclining block. 
The flat tariff lacks a price signal to customers to restrain use during peak periods.  In addition, 
customers that use electricity in off peak periods cross subsidise those customers using the 
electricity during peak period.  As discusses in section 6.1, customers with solar PV on accumulation 
meters make their contribution to the grid mainly in the off peak period but power is valued at the 
same price as the consumption of electricity during peak periods.  This situation exacerbates the 
cross subsidy. 
In comparison, the inclining-block tariff charges customers based on the quantity of electricity used.  
This pricing scheme provides an improvement over the flat tariff because customers who use larger 
quantities of electricity tend to have air conditioners and the peakiness of demand in the residential 
sector is mainly driven by air conditioners.  This peak demand drives increased investment in 
transmission and distribution infrastructure.  Customers with solar PV undermine the mute price 
signal provided by inclining block, as solar PV reduces the accumulation meter reading of the 
quantity of electricity used, which may well move the customer onto a cheaper block rate even if the 
customer is a heavy user of electricity and air conditioners. 
Both inclining block and flat tariffs cause cross substitution of costs from customers with solar PV to 
customers without solar PV, because the tariffs lacks a ‘time of use price’ signal.  Furthermore, a 
retailer’s margin is calculated on the quantities displayed on accumulation meters.  This quantity is 
reduced for customers with solar PV, causing an additional cross substitution cost from solar PV 
owners to non-owners, as retailers try to maintain their profits.  In Section 2 we discussed how this 
situation is inequitable.  Furthermore, the cross substitution is a symptom of a poor price signal and 
poor economics.  Both these tariffs, when used with accumulation meters, present an unsustainable 
FiT for solar PV.  A remedy is real time pricing that requires replacing accumulation meters with 
interval or smart meters (EY 2011, p. 4; Futura 2011, p. 4; PwC 2011, p. 5) 
In Victoria and New South Wales, where interval or smart meters are installed, there are TOU tariffs 
with peak, shoulder and off-peak prices and in some cases seasonally adjusted TOU (STOU) tariffs.  
These TUOS and DUOS tariffs provide the basis for a more sustainable FiT.  However, developing a 
TOU or STOU tariff requires consideration of the fact that the demand load profile differs for each 
node and between seasons.  However, as PwC (2011, p. 5) pointed out, there are limitations to the 
extent that TUOS and DUOS charges for residential and small business customers can fully reflect 
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their locational characteristics due to the complexity and logistical costs associated with developing 
locational specific charges. 
6.5 Implementing real time pricing and behaviour modification 
Futura (2011, pp. 13-5) reviews the effectiveness of the real time pricing schemes across the NEM 
and finds that all the schemes cause customers to reduce demand in peak periods.  TOU has a 
moderate effect of about 4% and Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) of around 30%.  Despite these positive 
results, a moratorium on real time pricing was established in Victoria caused by the lack of promised 
IHDs and protection for the most vulnerable consumers.  The World Energy Council (WEC 2010, p. 31) 
discussed how the Australian and Victorian legislators paid considerable attention to the 
functionality of smart meters and cost benefit analysis but overlooked the customer engagement 
required to achieve peak load clipping.  Engagement requires a well designed pricing structure in 
conjunction with education and innovative feedback interfaces. 
The efficacy of feedback interfaces in trails with Dynamic Peak Pricing (DPP) in the NEM find that 
IHDs have limited impact on consumer response to real time pricing compared to customers without 
displays (Futura 2011, pp. 68-70).  However the trial only compared a web interface with an IHD with 
a web interface without an IHD.  In contrast, Faruqui et al (2010) survey a dozen US and 
international sites and find that IHDs do induce customers to save on energy by an average of 7 
percent.  However, the evidence for demand response to real time pricing augmented with IHDs is 
limited to two sites in the survey.  
WEC (2010, p. 4) recommends that regulators calculate the impact of a smart meter rollout and new 
tariffs on vulnerable consumers.  There are at least two solutions to ameliorate the impact: 
• offer a flat tariff to those on benefits; or 
• increase payments to those on benefit support. 
Recipients of benefit support and low income individuals are less likely to own power hungry 
appliances, so a flat tariff that lacks a price-signal to deter consumption during peak demand is less 
problematic than a flat tariff with more wealthy individuals.   
Increasing the payment to those on a benefit support to cover the increases in electricity prices 
induced by dynamic pricing has the advantage that the price-signal to defer electricity use during 
peak period remains.  If a beneficiary is willing to shift demand from peak periods, they could be 
better off under such an arrangement. 
6.6 Energy storage uptake driven by the aforementioned price signals 
In this section, we discuss how the aforementioned price signals can work together to enhance the 
uptake of energy storage to defer investment in transmission and distribution. 
Energy storage offers the benefit of ‘time shifting’ that allows electricity to be produced for 
consumption at a later time.  Time shifting has at least two major applications.  Firstly, generators 
have the ability to store energy off peak for release onto the grid during peak time, which provides 
investment deferment in generation.  Secondly, storage located adjacent to net demand regions on 
the grid transfers energy during off peak to meet peak demand, which provides investment 
deferment potential for both transmission and generation. 
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The University of Queensland, in conjunction with an Australian battery storage developer, RedFlow, 
are testing the cost-effectiveness of RedFlow’s 400kWh battery storage unit connected to 390kW of 
UQ’s  1.2 MW solar array, which is the largest array in Australia (Foster et al. 2011).  The RedFlow 
battery storage and the University of Queensland solar PV arrangement feeds into the grid.  On a 
smaller scale, Ausgrid, as part of the Smart Grid Smart Cities Project, will be testing the effectiveness 
of 40 RedFlow 5 kVA batteries installed in residences in the Newcastle area.  In a second trial, 20 
RedFlow storage units will be deployed in residences in Scone, New South Wales to test whether 
battery storage can make rural electricity supply more reliable (Futura 2011, p. 93). 
Battery storage is a proven technology that can defer investment in distribution and transmission 
but it is currently too expensive for general deployment to householders with solar PV installations.  
However, given the rapid pace of price decreases with technological developments and the slow 
pace of regulatory reform, it is prudent to start putting the aforementioned price signals in place, so 
householders can evaluate the cost of advantage of using storage in conjunction with their solar PV 
installation to meet their own demand during the peak periods.  Alternatively, if price signals fail to 
provide fair recompense for the solar PV installations, householders could install battery storage and 
simply decide to disconnect themselves from the grid, which would prove economically suboptimal.   
Finally, energy storage does lend itself to technological innovation to enable switching between 
storing energy and feeding electricity into the grid during price spikes to provide market stability.  
6.8 Reverse auction FiT for large scale solar PV 
Foster et al (2011, p. 2) discuss how solar PV has acknowledged potential to defer transmission 
investments, which are largely driven by peak demand.  However, residential solar PV is insufficient 
in scale to make a significant difference. This would require commercial solar PV installation on a 
large scale. However, unlike countries such as Germany and Spain, Australia has, until recently, had 
very few incentives for commercial installations.  
Morris and Johnston (2011) estimate that 8 percent of suitable homes in Australia are fitted with 
solar PV and that solar PV contributed 0.284 percent of total generation in 2011 (Morris & Johnston 
2011, p. 9).  So, even if every suitable home in Australia installs solar PV, the penetration of the 
electricity market is still very small. 
Williams (2011) discusses the commoditisation of residential solar PV, which is evidence that the 
residential segment of the solar PV market has moved beyond infant industry status and beyond 
infant industry support requirements.  Large and medium-scale solar PV segments are still in their 
infancy and still warrant direct infant industry support, because the installation of medium and of 
large-scale solar PV requires a much higher degree of skill than residential solar PV. 
Morris and Johnston (2011) discuss how the FiTs for residential solar PV around Australia are being 
wound back.  Provided that the schemes are replaced by a sustainable FiT, this action is appropriate 
and will help to remove the boom bust cycle experienced by the residential solar PV industry under 
the various FiT schemes.  Understanding how FiT legislation caused boom-bust cycles in other 
countries provides valuable lessons for developing a sustainable FiT for large scale solar PV.   
In infant industry assistance, Corbell (2011) announced the first FiT in Australia for large scale solar.  
The plan uses a FiT reverse auction for the two large scale solar generation plants capable of 
powering 7 000 homes.  The reverse auction appears to be a much more appropriate method to 
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target an infant industry than the oversubscribed fixed residential or micro FiT.  Reverse auction FiT 
includes the following advantages over previous FiT schemes:  
• the technology matures each time the auction is held and the FiT becomes smaller, 
which provides an inexpensive way to maintain policy integrity and support infant 
industries; 
• the auctions naturally become redundant once the FiT reaches a levelised cost of 
energy; and 
• the two issues of over subscription and of overly supporting an infant industry 
become redundant. 
This large scale FiT policy is a sustainable approach and appropriate for large scale solar PV but 
unsuitable for residential FiT for four reasons: 
• inequity; 
• the transaction costs involved for numerous participants in the auctions;   
• logistical cost of maintaining numerous FiT rates; and  
• residential solar PV no longer requires infant industry support. 
6.9 Carbon Price Reduction Scheme is a component of a sustainable FiT 
The CPRS in Australia provides a price signal for a major environmental aspect of sustainability, that 
is, a price on CO2 emissions.  The positive externalities of solar PV are: producing electricity with a 
low carbon life cycle; not using arable land and deferring investment in transmission and distribution.  
The CPRS is designed to help internalise these benefits to allow market prices to reflect these 
benefits.   The CPRS starts with a fixed carbon price in July 2012, which converts to an emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) in July 2015 (DCCEE 2011). 
The fixed carbon price and ETS both have pros and cons.  A fixed price for carbon emissions provides 
a stable income for the government and a stable business environment as everyone knows in 
advance the price of carbon emissions.   The disadvantage is the inability to accurately target the 
total amount of emission.  In contrast, an ETS can target the total amount of emissions but the 
disadvantage is a variable price for emissions, which is determined by a market.  Price variability 
creates an unstable income for the government and business instability. 
In addition, the ETS, being a market arrangement, is susceptible to market failure.  Ellerman and 
Joskow (2008) discuss three market failures in the case of the established European Union (EU) ETS: 
over allocation, price volatility and windfall profits for generators.  Ellerman and Joskow (2008) 
consider these as part of the learning experience in a new kind of market, which can be overcome by 
using more accurate information, by allowing the banking of credits between compliance periods 
and by increasing the frequency of auctioning.  Despite these learning experiences, Lewis (2011) 
reports that there has been a significant drop in EU ETS carbon prices due to a combination of over 
allocation and the aftermath of the global financial crisis in Europe.  The EU ETS experience has 
provided Australia with many valuable lessons and shows that developing a robust ETS comes with 
many unforseen problems. 
There are plans to extend the domestic ETS to trade carbon credits internationally, which invites 
other sources of market failure.  Garnaut (2008) discusses how international trading provides a 
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mechanism to lower the overall costs to the world of the transformation to lower CO2 emissions.  
However, this trading proposal has three major problems: 
• international corruption; 
• losing government revenue; and 
• losing a policy tool to promote renewable energy sources domestically. 
In relation to international corruption, Transparency International (TI 2011) produces an 
international corruption perception index on 182 countries.  Table 19 shows the 16 least corrupt 
countries where Australia is ranked 8th.  The index is a compilation of the results from a number of 
surveys designed in a way that allows basic statistical analysis.  Since most of the world ranks as 
being more corrupt than Australia, this does raise credibility issues over an international trade in 
carbon credits.  For instance, in the least corrupt country, New Zealand (NZ), Stock (2011) reports on 
the NZ ETS experience in trading carbon credits internationally where the price for a NZ Unit (NZU) 
went from $22 in May 2011 to $11 in late November 2011.  This halving in the price of a NZU was 
the result of NZ emitters’ ability to import carbon credits.  However Stock (2011) claims that some of 
the UN-backed Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) are of suspect validity and predicts that the NZ 
Government will substantially curtail the import of CER. 
Table 2 International Corruption Perception Index for 2011 
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1 New Zealand 9.5 1 9 0.05 9.7 9.1 9.4 9.5 
2 Denmark 9.4 2 8 0.05 9.5 9.1 9.3 9.5 
2 Finland 9.4 2 8 0.07 9.8 9.1 9.3 9.5 
4 Sweden 9.3 4 9 0.08 9.7 8.9 9.2 9.4 
5 Singapore 9.2 5 12 0.13 9.5 8.1 8.9 9.4 
6 Norway 9.0 6 9 0.07 9.3 8.7 8.9 9.1 
7 Netherlands 8.9 7 9 0.11 9.3 8.1 8.7 9.1 
8 Australia 8.8 8 11 0.12 9.4 8.2 8.6 9.0 
8 Switzerland 8.8 8 8 0.22 9.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 
10 Canada 8.7 10 9 0.15 9.3 8.1 8.4 8.9 
11 Luxembourg 8.5 11 8 0.25 9.1 7.1 8.1 8.9 
12 Hong Kong 8.4 12 11 0.17 9.1 7.3 8.1 8.7 
13 Iceland 8.3 13 8 0.27 9.5 7.1 7.8 8.7 
14 Germany 8.0 14 10 0.18 9.1 7.1 7.8 8.4 
14 Japan 8.0 14 12 0.27 9.1 5.7 7.6 8.5 
16 Austria 7.8 16 10 0.24 8.9 6.7 7.4 8.2 
(Source: TI 2011) 
The credibility problem could be overcome by only allowing the purchase of carbon credits from 
selected countries, such as the highly ranked countries in Table 19.  However, the problems of losing 
government revenue and of dissipating CPRS’s role in promoting renewable generation still exist. 
Two options to address carbon emissions are a carbon tax or ETS.  In Europe, the tax option is 
unviable as the British and French governments have both shown little interest in harmonising taxes 
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between EU member states.  So, there is little scope but to try to fix the EU’s ETS.  However, in 
Australia both options are available.  The allure of an ETS to reduce carbon emissions at least cost 
has to be weighed against the failure of the ETS in Europe.  A prudent approach would be to run the 
fixed carbon price arrangement as an explicit carbon tax scheme until a number of countries have 
developed a stable ETS, at which point the Australian ETS could be modelled on the successful 
overseas ETS.  This approach is worth considering because Australia is more carbon intensive than 
other OECD countries, so a dysfunctional ETS is potentially more damaging to the economy and, 
correspondingly, to the solar PV industry. 
The third hybrid option is using a floor on the carbon price within an ETS, as discussed in Daley and 
Edis (2010).  This option combines the positive aspects of the carbon tax for price stability and of the 
ETS to find the least cost methods to address carbon emissions.   The current CPRS legislation, the 
Clean Energy Bill 2011 (DCCEE 2011, p. 12) does provide for a price floor and ceiling for the first 
three years of the ETS.  This Clean Energy Bill addresses most of the aforementioned problems with 
the ETS for the first six years; initially, three years with a fixed carbon price, then three years as an 
ETS with a price collar.  These six years should provide enough time to learn from the successes and 
failures of ETS elsewhere. 
7 Conclusion 
Sustainable feed-in tariffs for solar PV are at the confluence of social equity, environmental 
protection and economic growth.  Market failures arise in each and options to address these have 
been identified in this paper.  Indexed interest free loans are proposed to address investment 
myopia and social inequity.  This paper also discusses the lack of appropriate price signals for 
environmental protection and economic growth in the solar PV industry and options to address 
these market failures.   
A key issue is the requirement to replace traditional accumulation meters with smart meters to 
provide real time pricing.  Smart meters will introduce appropriate price signals for deferment in 
TUOS and in DUOS and contribution to the grid.  Additionally, real time pricing will help remove the 
cross subsidy from poorer households to wealthier households. 
The use of solar PV in conjunction with accumulation meters debases the profit margin for retailers.  
This dynamic destroys the incentive for retailers to engage with those who have solar PV 
installations.  The proposed price signals maintain a profit margin for the retailers to ensure their 
ongoing interest. 
However the profits of NSPs are based on their capital expenditure.  This creates a dynamic that is at 
odds with environmental protection and provides a disincentive for NSPs to connect solar PV.  Thus, 
the NSPs require incentivising to connect solar PV. 
The proposed price signals are designed to accommodate developments in battery storage and 
maintain a profit margin for the retailers.  The lack of action on developing appropriate price signals 
for connected solar PV could well see some households disconnecting from the grid once battery 
storage becomes more inexpensive.  This situation would be economically suboptimal for the 
economy as a whole. 
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